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YESTERDAY I WAS LYING: 
CREEPING PRECLUSION OF RECIPROCAL 
FEE AWARDS IN RESIDENTIAL 
FORECLOSURE LITIGATION 
ERIC A. ZACKS & DUSTIN A. ZACKS† 
INTRODUCTION 
“Yesterday, I was lying.  Today I’m telling the truth.” 
- Bob Arum, Boxing Promoter and Attorney1 
 
As a result of the high volume of foreclosure litigation in the 
wake of the Great Recession, scholars have explored several 
outgrowths of the foreclosure crisis, developing a burgeoning body 
of research.  Scholars and commentators have authored studies 
about a wide variety of foreclosure-related topics, ranging from the 
disparate racial effects of the housing crisis2 to the many 
legislative and court-instituted policies enacted to ameliorate the 
harsh reality faced by financially distressed homeowners, all the 
way through books examining the aftermath of the crisis and 
lessons learned from the entire experience.3 
 
† Eric A. Zacks is an Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law 
School. B.A., University of Michigan, 1998; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002. Dustin 
A. Zacks is a member of King, Nieves, & Zacks PLLC in West Palm Beach, Florida. 
B.A., University of Michigan, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007. 
1 Kevin Iole, Bob Arum Explains Infamous ‘Yesterday I Was Lying, Today I’m 
Telling the Truth’ Line, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 29, 2016, 4:16 PM), https://sports.yahoo. 
com/blogs/boxing/bob-arum-explains-infamous—yesterday-i-was-lying—today-i-m-
telling-the-truth—line-201538810.html (“On the first night, Arum championed the 
cause of one fighter. The next night, under the same circumstances with everyone 
drinking heavily again, Arum reignited the argument. This time, though, instead of 
arguing for the fighter he had the night before, he was arguing for the other fighter. 
Bob Waters, a sports writer at Newsday in New York, called him on it. ‘Bob said, “Hey, 
last night you said A was better and now you’re saying it’s B,” ’ Arum said. ‘And so I 
smiled and I said, “Well, yesterday I was lying. Today I’m telling the truth.” ’ ”). 
2 See André Douglas Pond Cummings, Families of Color in Crisis: Bearing the 
Weight of the Financial Market Meltdown, 55 HOW. L.J. 303, 303 (2012). 
3 See Dustin A. Zacks, The Grand Bargain: Pro-Borrower Responses to the 
Housing Crisis and Implications for Future Lending and Homeownership, 57 LOY.  
L. REV. 541, 557 (2011) [hereinafter Zacks, The Grand Bargain]. See generally 
CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN 
1148 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1147   
Our previous contributions to this evolving body of research 
primarily focused on idiosyncratic and troubling doctrinal 
developments in foreclosure litigation.  This Article provides 
another data point, consistent with our other findings—namely, 
that in response to the record levels of foreclosure cases, judges 
and legislatures largely chose symbolic palliative actions to give 
an appearance of helping distressed homeowners, while at the 
same time systematically narrowing borrower defenses.4  In 
previous research, we offered support for these two points in 
several different contexts: 
• Legislative and judicial efforts at ameliorating externalities 
of the foreclosure crisis;5 
• Disciplinary actions or investigations regarding a host of 
questionable or unethical foreclosure attorney conduct;6 
• Judicial treatment of borrower defenses to fraudulent or 
problematic assignments of mortgage or other title transfer 
documentation commonly used in foreclosure litigation;7 
• Application of statutes of limitation and the doctrine of res 
judicata to lender claims in foreclosure cases;8 and  
 
ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (2019); LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH 
FOX, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO: HOW THE HARDEST HIT HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY (2019).  
4 As one small emblematic example, at the same time the Florida Legislature was 
forced to enact additional pleading and documentation requirements for banks to 
ensure that bank attorneys would not continue to falsely assert that promissory notes 
had been lost in thousands of cases, the legislature simultaneously enacted laws that 
would allow banks and their attorneys to progress towards final judgments with less 
hindrance. See H.R. 87, 23d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (creating an easier 
pathway for banks to litigate using orders to show cause for final judgments of 
foreclosure at the very outset of litigation, an alternative to the traditional rules of 
pleading in civil procedure). 
5 Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 542. 
6 Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2013) 
[hereinafter Zacks, Robo-Litigation]. As mentioned in Robo-Litigation, in one case the 
chief judge of a county plagued with an enormous backlog of foreclosure cases quit his 
post as judge to take a position at a high-volume foreclosure firm under investigation 
by the state attorney general. Id. at 886. 
7 See Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, Not a Party: Challenging Mortgage 
Assignments, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 175, 179–83 (2014); Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. 
Zacks, A Standing Question: Mortgages, Assignment, and Foreclosure, 40 J. CORP. L. 
705, 718–26 (2015) [hereinafter Zacks & Zacks, A Standing Question]. 
8 See Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, No Brakes: Loan Acceleration and 
Diminishing Foreclosure Defenses, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 
390 (2018) [hereinafter Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes]. 
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• Borrower challenges to Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. and its fundamental alteration of traditional 
American recording practices.9 
Our previous research articulated a new understanding of the 
reasoning behind many of the attacks upon, or narrowing of, 
borrower defenses and the lack of strict accountability for 
questionable bank litigation practices.  In sum, it appears that 
state actors systemically frame the foreclosure context differently 
from other types of civil litigation.  The consequence of this 
framing is that judges are emboldened to modify or dispense with 
traditional civil practice procedures or doctrines, typically to the 
detriment of financially distressed homeowners facing foreclosing 
entities with significantly more resources.10   
This Article extends this analysis and theory of systemic 
framing to yet another area of longstanding jurisprudence facing 
attack and overhaul in the context of distressed homeowner 
litigation—namely, the applicability and availability of attorneys’ 
fees awards to the successful homeowner-litigant.  Most, if not all, 
mortgage contracts specifically allow for the foreclosing entity to 
recover their attorneys’ fees in the event of default and 
foreclosure.11  Many state statutes contain automatic reciprocity 
provisions for such one-sided attorneys’ fees provisions regardless 
of the type of contract.12  Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly in the wake 
of our prior research, traditional application of such reciprocity 
has begun to deteriorate and erode in the face of judicial 
 
9 See Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, 
Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 551, 552–53 
(2011) [hereinafter Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine]; Dustin A. Zacks, Revenge 
of the Clerks: MERS Confronts County Clerk and Qui Tam Lawsuits, 32 BANKING & 
FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 17, 17–18 (2013). 
10 Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 434 (“Thus, while we have 
previously posited that judges preview the merits of individual foreclosure claims and 
discount homeowner claims accordingly, we now suggest that the overall systemic 
frame of court administration responses to the foreclosure crisis enforced and created 
an atmosphere of almost ministerial enforcement or of a collection mechanism rather 
than serving any truth-seeking function. Framing lawsuits primarily in terms of 
efficiency rather than factfinding renders foreclosure a foregone conclusion, especially 
when judges have an incentive to clear a large backlog of foreclosure cases such as 
those pending after the 2008 financial crisis.”). 
11 For an example of such language in a typical mortgage, see Florida  
Single Family Mortgage Uniform Instrument Form 3010, FANNIE MAE ¶ 22, 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/3010w.doc (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) 
(“If the default is not cured . . . [l]ender shall be entitled to collect all expenses 
incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not 
limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .”). 
12 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(7) (West 2019). 
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skepticism towards awarding homeowners’ attorneys’ fees.13  
Accordingly, this Article continues the same narrative, in another 
context, of state actors viewing and treating distressed 
homeowners differently than other civil litigants, to the detriment 
of those homeowners.  Lenders are allowed to plead for recovery 
under the mortgage, but in those rare instances when they lose for 
standing or for title reasons, they may then seek to avoid paying 
attorneys’ fees under the fee recovery statute because of that lack 
of standing or title.  In other words, courts permit lenders to “lie 
yesterday” about being the proper party to enforce the contract 
and believe that they are “telling the truth” today about not being 
a party to the contract, which otherwise would require paying the 
homeowners’ attorneys’ fees.  
Part I begins with an explanation of the American Rule of 
awarding attorneys’ fees and discusses the standard for fee 
shifting statutes in the face of one-sided contract provisions.  Part 
II discusses and analyzes how judges and litigants have 
successfully begun attacking traditional application of fee-shifting 
statutes in the context of foreclosure litigation.  Part III concludes 
with the policy implications of narrowing the availability of 
reciprocal fee awards.  
I. AMERICAN RULE; FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES; STANDARDS 
A. The American Rule and Its Implications 
In civil litigation conducted within the United States, each 
party is generally responsible for bearing its own litigation fees 
and is generally prohibited from recovering attorneys’ fees from 
the losing party.14  This principle is known as the American Rule.15  
The rule is subject to criticism because it may not make the 
prevailing party “whole” and compensate it sufficiently.16  This 
 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See 10 FERN M. SMITH, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE CIVIL § 54.171(1)(a); 
James R. Maxeiner, The American “Rule”: Assuring the Lion His Share, in COST AND 
FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 288 (Mathias Reimann 
ed., 2012) (IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE SER.  
NO. 11).  
15 James R. Maxeiner, supra note 14, at 288. The “English Rule,” which generally 
permits the prevailing party to recover its fees and costs from the losing party, seems 
to predominate among legal systems in the West. Id. 
16 Id. at 288, 293 (“Through control of litigation, lawyers can force opposing 
parties to devote resources to litigation; thanks to the no indemnity practice [of the 
American Rule], those resources are forever lost.”).  
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failure to adequately compensate prevailing parties can therefore 
deter plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims.17  For example, a 
potential suit for a few thousand dollars with no hope of recovering 
attorneys’ fees may simply not be worth a litigant’s time or effort, 
and an aggrieved party may find it impossible to find an attorney 
to bring an otherwise valid claim.18   
In such a situation, an attorney might only take such a small 
matter on either (i) an hourly basis, which in the course of routine 
civil litigation could easily dwarf the total amount of the judgment 
sought, rendering pursuit of such judgment entirely wasteful; or 
(ii) a contingency basis, which could involve such a large portion of 
any potential recovery that a client determines litigation would 
not be worth the effort.  These two scenarios, of course, assume 
that an attorney would actually consider taking such a small case 
on either fee basis with no possibility of recovering attorneys’ fees. 
Aside from deterring potential plaintiffs from bringing 
otherwise valid claims, application of the American Rule may also 
be criticized because it causes innocent defendants a loss.  In other 
words, a defendant may successfully and conclusively argue that 
her conduct was not negligent, that she did not breach a contract, 
or that a plaintiff’s case does not otherwise satisfy the elements of 
a given claim.  Yet, just as in the above case of a plaintiff deterred 
from bringing an otherwise valid claim, this otherwise successful 
defendant may not be made whole because she will not be 
recompensed for her attorneys’ fees in defending the meritless or 
unproven claim.19  In this way, the American Rule may also 
insufficiently deter plaintiffs from bringing meritless or tenuous 
claims to court.20  Just as in the case of a plaintiff who secures 
victory on a valid claim only to see that judgment rendered a 
nullity by her attorney’s bills, a successful defendant may feel that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 See id. at 293 (“[The American Rule] destroys meritorious claims and promotes 
baseless ones.”). 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. at 294 (“The public takes greater notice, however, of baseless claims  
that are enabled by no indemnity and lawyer control. This combination permits weak 
parties with weak claims to extract settlements even from strong parties with  
strong defenses.”). 
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defeat of an opponent’s claim is entirely hollow, given that she 
spent potentially thousands of dollars on the defense and suffered 
the emotional effects of enduring protracted litigation.21  
On the other hand, the American Rule may protect vulnerable 
litigants without sufficient litigation resources from bearing the 
risk of paying their opponent’s fees should they be defeated in 
court.22  The indigent or low-income litigant, even if represented 
on a contingency basis and with no capital outlay at the inception 
of a case, might still refrain from bringing a suit against a  
more sizable or powerful entity based on the possibility of an 
adverse attorneys’ fees award.  In this way, the American Rule 
may be said to ameliorate the imbalance of power and resources  
between parties.23   
If attorneys’ fees awards for losing parties were a risk in 
bringing claims or defenses, then this would induce powerful 
parties to always hire the most expensive counsel possible and to 
litigate solely for the purpose of increasing possible fee awards so 
as to raise barriers to entry to litigation.24  Few, if any, indigent or 
low-income clients would bother to bring any sort of small claim 
against a powerful entity if they were to bear the risk of paying 
their opponent to employ an army of expensive lawyers.   
As a result of these issues raised by the American Rule, many 
exceptions to the rule have developed at the federal and state level.  
These exceptions can be mandatory in nature and require the 
losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees or costs or may be 
permissive in allowing a court discretion in awarding such fees.25  
For example, the indigent or low-income client who may be 
deterred from bringing an otherwise valid claim may find relief in 
 
21 See, e.g., Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 543–44 (discussing the 
toll foreclosure litigation may take on homeowners, including harm to financial, 
physical, and emotional health). 
22 See Terese A. West, Everybody Pays: Attorneys Fees and the American Rule, 
MOSS & BARNETT (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.lawmoss.com/pp/publication-everybody-
pays-attorneys-fees-and-the-american-rule.pdf?77489. 
23 See id. (“[T]he American rule presumes the existence of legitimate disputes and 
ensures that neither party need fear an undue financial burden for turning to an 
impartial forum for resolution.”). 
24 See id. (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 231 (1872) (“When both client and 
counsel know that the fees are to be paid by the other party there is danger of abuse.”)). 
25 In regard to costs, for example, see FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(d) (“Costs in any action 
dismissed under this rule shall be assessed and judgment for costs entered in that 
action . . . .”). In regard to fees, see Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 
897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]t is well established that Florida follows the 
‘American Rule’; thus, attorney’s fees may only be awarded when authorized by 
contract or statute.”).  
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a statute designed to encourage attorneys to bring such lawsuits.  
Such statutes might explicitly provide that attorneys’ fees  
awards are available in suits alleging fair housing violations, 
discrimination against a protected class, or whistleblower 
actions.26  The clear goals and implications of such statutes 
abrogating the American Rule are that public policy ought to 
encourage bringing certain actions and that public interest 
statutes would rarely be enforced or sought to be enforced if fees 
awards were not possible.27  Similarly, other statutes or rules may 
lessen the harsh application of the American Rule for litigants 
defending against tenuous claims by allowing for attorneys’ fees 
awards in the cases of frivolous actions or claims, or by allowing 
sanctions that include discretionary attorneys’ fees awards in 
cases of improper or dilatory conduct.28 
Separate and apart from statutory regimes or rules of 
procedure modifying the American Rule in a specific context, state 
law generally treats the American Rule as a default rule that can 
be changed by contract.29  Consequently, it is routine for parties to 
enter into contracts that include provisions requiring the losing 
party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the prevailing party.30   
 
26 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How 
Fee-Shifting Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice 
(Though Some Judges Don’t Get It) 6–7 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 150, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407275. 
27 See id. at 7. 
28 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(1) (West 2019): 
“Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, including prejudgment interest, to be paid to the 
prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s 
attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or 
action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s 
attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially 
presented to the court or at any time before trial:  
(a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the 
claim or defense; or 
(b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to 
those material facts.” 
29 See Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 219 So. 3d at 897. Contracts typically are governed 
by state law, and more specifically, by the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract 
is made or enforced. Federal law may preempt the enforceability of fee-shifting 
provisions to the extent that a particular legal area has been “federalized.” Smith, 
supra note 14, § 54.171(1)(a). In addition, federal law also may specifically mandate, 
or permit a federal court to rule, that the American Rule does not apply and 
specifically provide for the prevailing party to be able to recover its attorneys’ fees. 
See id. § 54.171(3)(a). 
30 See SMITH, supra note 14, § 54.171(1)(a).  
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The American Rule and its exceptions have played an 
increasingly important part in mortgage foreclosure litigation 
since the beginning of the Great Recession.  Most, if not all, lenders 
include fee-shifting provisions that require the borrower to pay the 
costs and fees of the lender if the lender prevails in litigation 
concerning the mortgage, such as a foreclosure action.31  These 
provisions are obviously one-sided as written in that they only 
require one party to pay if it loses but do not explicitly provide the 
same benefit if that same party actually prevails.  Such one-sided 
provisions are particularly punitive in the context of consumer 
form contracts or other agreements where contracts are offered on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.32  
In the mortgage context, strict application of such unilateral 
contractual provisions leads to a bevy of problematic implications.  
A lender, for example, would be permitted to pursue tenuous 
claims or engage in wasteful litigation practices designed to 
increase defense costs, and the successfully defending borrower 
would not be entitled to any relief from its fees expended in 
defending against the claims.  Lenders would likewise face no 
consequences for filing questionable or insufficiently proven 
claims, dismissing them, and then refiling such claims ad 
infinitum until eventually winning a judgment.  The costs to a 
major financial institution or large servicer of bringing a lawsuit, 
which include court filing fees and the fees paid to outside 
counsel—often hired on the basis of ability to provide low-cost, 
high-volume representation—have clearly not been effective 
deterrents to stopping foreclosing entities from perpetrating 
questionable tactics in litigation.33   
For example, attorneys in judicial foreclosure states—where a 
lender must bring a lawsuit as a plaintiff in order to foreclose a 
homeowner and in which the lenders faced and paid attorneys’ fees 
awards for case dismissals during the height of the housing 
crisis—still did not effectively eliminate a host of problematic 
practices in state courts.34  Even when faced with the risk of a fee 
award to their opponents after a dismissal or a court-awarded 
 
31 Indeed, the Fannie Mae uniform mortgage contains such a fee-shifting 
provision. See Florida Single Family Mortgage Uniform Instrument Form 3010, supra 
note 11, ¶ 22. 
32 See Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 169, 176–77, 180–82 
(2012) [hereinafter Zacks, Contracting Blame]. 
33 See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 884–88, 890, 901–03. 
34 See id. at 891–92. 
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sanction, lenders or their attorneys still submitted thousands of 
improperly verified affidavits and assignments.35  Thus, when this 
risk of extra expense or penalty for blameworthy conduct is 
removed, foreclosing entities and their attorneys might be  
even more cavalier about their adherence to ethical standards  
in litigation.   
Further, for distressed or financially at-risk homeowners, the 
possibility of not recouping attorneys’ fees after defending 
successive meritless or unproven suits may cause the further 
deterioration of their household financial situation, decreasing the 
likelihood of any possibility to save their homes through 
reinstatement or settlement.36  Foreclosing entities would or could, 
in this scenario, eventually prevail regardless of the underlying 
merit of their claims, as they could simply exhaust the resources 
of homeowners in continually defending lawsuits to a point where 
hiring counsel becomes impossible.   
This is not an idle threat.  One of the benefits to homeowners 
of a judicially supervised—and therefore elongated—foreclosure 
process is the ability to bolster financial resources during the 
process in order to reinstate or to appear more favorable for a 
settlement, such as a modification of loan terms.37  This effect, 
however, can be tempered in cases in which foreclosing entities 
conduct their litigation more vigorously through, for example, 
taking extensive discovery and depositions and through delaying 
settlement negotiations.38  Each dollar borrowers spend on counsel 
is an opportunity cost insofar as that dollar was not spent on trying 
to reinstate their loans.  Given that the borrowers’ legal fees may 
not be recouped, lenders may be incentivized to litigate more 
extensively, thus lowering the possibility of optimal settlement or 
workout for distressed homeowners.  
 
 
 
 
35 See id. at 902, 906, 907. 
36 See Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 544 (noting the mere fact of a 
filed foreclosure on one’s credit history, to give one example, can result in job 
termination or other catastrophic financial harm). 
37 See id. at 563.  
38 See, e.g., id. at 564 n.117 (citing empirical research showing longer foreclosure 
processes may simply result in higher indebtedness). In this way, elongating the 
foreclosure process through pro-homeowner rulings could actually work to a 
borrower’s detriment.  
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In a practice area where, during the recent recession, some 
counties reported that more than ninety percent of homeowners 
facing foreclosure failed to retain counsel, this is a serious issue.39  
Foreclosing entities already enjoy a large disparity in resources 
and ability to conduct litigation.  Removing the slight risk of 
paying their opponents’ attorneys’ fees only encourages the 
exploitation of this disparity of resources in such cases when 
borrowers actually hire counsel.  It also makes the borrower’s 
choice of whether to devote dollars to defense lawyers or to a 
possible reinstatement payment more stark.  Therefore, as a result 
of the harsh implications of the American Rule, states have 
enacted statutes to dull the sharp edges that strict application of 
such unilateral contractual fees clauses could bring. 
B. Fee-Shifting State Statutes 
Some state statutes permit, but do not require, a court to 
award fees to the prevailing party if the contract would otherwise 
have required that same party to pay its opponent’s fees if it had 
lost.40  Such regimes are generally an attempt to restore the 
mutuality of risk relative to success in the litigation and to restore 
the balance that may not have existed when the contract was 
executed and the one-sided clause was included.41  As suggested in 
the prior section, such statutes appear well-suited to the 
foreclosure context, where lenders normally insert one-sided 
fee-shifting clauses and are more likely to institute claims based 
upon the contracts, thus potentially leaving borrowers who 
successfully defend foreclosures without a remedy for the 
attorneys’ fees they necessarily incurred. 
 
39 See Melanca Clark & Maggie Barron, Foreclosures: A Crisis in Legal 
Representation, BRENNAN CTR. for JUST. 14, 16 (2009), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/foreclosures-crisis-legal-
representation. Indeed, this logic is parallel to our arguments against eliminating any 
functional statute of limitations in mortgage foreclosures.  
40 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(7) (West 2019) (“If a contract contains a 
provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any 
action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or 
defendant, with respect to the contract. This subsection applies to any contract 
entered into on or after October 1, 1988.”). 
41 See Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d 804, 809 (Cal. 1995) (“As this court has explained, 
‘[s]ection 1717 [the fee-shifting statute] was enacted to establish mutuality of remedy 
where [a] contractual provision makes recovery of attorney’s fees available for only 
one party, and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney’s fee provisions.”).  
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The borrower in the context of mortgage contract formation 
and bargaining is likely in a substantially inferior position relative 
to the lender in many respects.  The borrower is likely unaware of 
such one-sided attorneys’ fees provisions or, even if she is aware of 
them, she is likely unable to negotiate away those provisions.42  If 
borrowers are unaware of such provisions, they are unlikely to 
seek alternatives, like lenders that do not require such a provision.  
This means that there is no competition incentivizing lenders to 
provide less one-sided provisions.43  Indeed, courts recognize this 
basis for paternalistically imposing reciprocity upon unilateral 
attorneys’ fees clauses: 
[S]ome bad bargains pervade frequently occurring transactions 
and have adverse consequences for society.  Unilateral fee 
provisions are usually seen in form contracts prepared by 
commercial entities.  Many of these forms govern consumer 
transactions.  The unilateral fee provision tucked away in the 
legal text of a form contract effectually deprives many consumers 
of access to the courts to redress contractual breaches.  But 
typically consumers lack sufficient bargaining power to coax 
business entities into recasting such fee provisions.  And 
commercial parties need no leveling in negotiating contract 
terms.  Thus the purpose behind section 57.105(7) is obviously 
that the Legislature found bilateral provisions necessary to 
enable consumers to have representation and, thereby, 
meaningful access to the machinery of justice in contractual 
disputes affecting important consumer and family interests.44 
Unilateral fee clauses also favor lenders in the sense that a 
lender is much more likely to be the party pursuing claims based 
on the nature of the lender-borrower relationship, such as those 
relating to nonpayment of the underlying debt.  This means that 
the borrower more often will be defending claims as opposed to 
seeking recovery under the contract.  The provision accordingly 
removes the risk of fee-shifting from the lender, the party most 
likely to be pursuing meritless claims, while heightening the risk 
of potential loss by the borrower, the party most likely  
to be defending claims, in each instance even when the  
borrower prevails.  In this instance, even when the borrowers win,  
 
 
 
42 See Zacks, Contracting Blame, supra note 32, at 176–77. 
43 See id. 
44 Mediplex Constr. of Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (Farmer, C.J., dissenting). 
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they still suffer a loss because they will not be compensated  
for the attorneys’ fees they have paid while defending their 
foreclosure cases.  
Accordingly, statutes that mandate fee-shifting in the 
foreclosure context, or otherwise permit a court to award fees to 
the prevailing party, can provide substantial benefits to borrowers 
that prevail in foreclosure proceedings.  As indicated above, one of 
the purposes of such provisions is to attempt to put the borrower 
back into the same place in which the borrower otherwise would 
have been had the lender not improperly or ineffectively 
prosecuted its litigation.45  Within the context of the litigation, the 
borrower is not actually coming out ahead in any sense, since the 
borrower is only recovering the fees that she otherwise would have 
to pay out of pocket.  
Courts that award fees to attorneys may also determine 
whether an enhanced fee recovery, such as a multiplier, is 
appropriate to compensate the attorney adequately for having 
taken on such a risky representation—that is, a contingency fee 
arrangement.46  In the case of a foreclosure dismissal, no actual 
dollar recovery is awarded to the homeowner-defendant.  Thus, the 
court has to determine what the value of the attorney’s 
representation was in light of the hours worked, the risk involved 
with such an arrangement, and the ability of the borrower to 
obtain adequate compensation without the attorney’s ability to 
seek a contingent recovery of fees.47  This is particularly important 
with respect to indigent or insolvent borrowers, who may be able 
to retain adequate counsel solely on a contingency basis or with 
some sort of contingency fee arrangement.  In some markets, 
borrower-defendants pay their attorney or attorneys a flat fixed 
monthly fee that does not equate to the amount that would have 
been paid if the homeowner had retained the attorney on an hourly 
basis.48  As such, borrowers’ attorneys often build in incentives for 
 
45 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
46 See Bank of N.Y. v. Williams, 979 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(finding no abuse of discretion in granting an award multiplying the attorney’s actual 
fees by a factor of 2.5); Vivot v. Bank of Am., NA, 115 So. 3d 428, 429–30 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2013); J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp. v. Golden, 98 So. 3d 220, 224 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
47 See Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (Fla. 1985); 
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 830–31 (Fla. 1990). 
48 See, e.g., Polyana da Costa, Attorney Defends Taking on Mortgages as 
Contingency Fee, DAILY BUS. REV. (Nov. 29, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/ 
almID/1202475433460/. 
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further compensation if in fact they are able to succeed in 
defending their clients.  As a result, many require their clients  
to include contingency fee features that demand their clients 
compensate them for the value of any recovery.49  The fee-shifting 
statutory regime and the possibility of a multiplied fee award 
accordingly allow courts to compensate borrower-defendants’ 
attorneys appropriately based on the contingent nature of  
their representation.  
Permitting borrowers to recover their fees thus may provide a 
substantial benefit to attorneys that defend borrowers as well as 
an incentive for attorneys to engage in such representation in the 
first place.  Furthermore, recovery of fees may allow homeowners 
in many cases to remain in their homes without making regular 
payments while the foreclosure litigation is being fought.  
Contrarily, if one views attorneys defending foreclosures as, in the 
words of one high-volume foreclosure firm attorney, “hordes of 
lawyers defending on the specious ground that their clients are not 
sure who to pay,”50 then allowing for fee awards only encourages 
such superficial or hypertechnical defense work.51   
Extrapolating this counterargument further, if attorneys’ fees 
awards make representation and dilatory defense tactics more 
likely, then one may say it is not only the individual litigants  
or opponents of such conduct who are harmed by the creation  
of additional incentives to represent homeowners.  Foreclosing 
entities might also argue that needlessly increasing costs of 
 
49 See id. 
50 American Legal and Financial Network’s Amended Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Support of Respondent at 13, Glass v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (No. SC17-1387). 
51 We briefly note that we do not refer to the amicus brief’s signator as working 
for a “high-volume foreclosure firm[]” without cause. See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra 
note 6, at 875. The attorney signing and submitting the amicus brief to the Florida 
Supreme Court is apparently employed by Choice Legal Group. See Brief in Support 
of Respondent, supra note 50, at 21. Choice Legal Group is a firm formerly known as 
the Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson; the firm changed its name because the firm’s 
namesake pleaded guilty to bar offenses in conducting foreclosure litigation and was 
temporarily suspended from practicing law. See Kim Miller, Foreclosure Mill Head 
Faces Florida Bar Discipline, PALM BEACH POST (Jan. 7, 2013), https://web.archive. 
org/web/20130123012852/http://blogs.palmbeachpost.com/realtime/2013/01/07/foreclo
sure-mill-head-faces-florida-bar-discipline/. Among other accusations, the Watson 
firm reportedly assigned attorneys to impossible caseload numbers. See Zacks, Robo-
Litigation, supra note 6, at 886 & n.167 (noting that an attorney for Watson testified 
to handling between five and six thousand cases at any one time). Watson’s firm 
eventually paid $2 million to settle the Florida Attorney General’s investigation into 
their foreclosure litigation practices. Id. at 886 & n.171. 
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litigation creates externalities for society as a whole in 
jurisdictions where reciprocal fee awards are allowed, including 
making future lending less likely or reducing the size of future 
loan offers in such jurisdictions.52  Similarly, these tactics are 
commonly blamed for tying up court dockets and delaying 
resolution of innumerable valid claims by months or years  
by grinding the resolution of civil dockets to a halt.53  Thus, 
although homeowners might argue that imposing reciprocity  
into unilateral fee provisions is the only way to ensure that 
litigants are made whole when facing unequal bargaining power  
combined with endless or sloppy litigation, foreclosing entities 
may correspondingly argue that such imposition results in damage 
to the judicial and financial systems and is wasteful in light of the 
overwhelming validity of most foreclosure claims. 
C. Fee-Shifting Requirements  
Fee-shifting statutes and case law interpreting them typically 
require the prevailing party that did not otherwise have the 
benefit of the contractual fee-shifting provision to demonstrate 
that it succeeded in some respect on the merits of the suit.54  This 
standard varies in practice from state to state, but generally can 
be satisfied by receiving some or all of the benefit sought in 
instituting the suit, such as some sort of damage recovery.55  
Whether the defendant is the prevailing party is a more 
difficult question than might otherwise appear.  Obviously, if the 
plaintiff does not win a final judgment, then it seems that the 
defendant should be deemed to be the prevailing party with 
respect to receiving the benefit of fee-shifting.  If one does not win 
at litigation, then one has inherently lost at litigation.  This is 
actually the situation, however, only when the defendant has 
succeeded in preventing the plaintiff from receiving any sort of 
 
52 See Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage 
Credit 1 (Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Working Paper No. 2003-16, 2001), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=410768. 
53 See Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 50, at 13–14 (referring to Florida 
courts as “bursting” with the aforementioned “hordes of [borrower defense] lawyers”).  
54 See, e.g., Blue Infiniti, LLC v. Wilson, 170 So. 3d 136, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015) (discussing prevailing party status in the context of voluntary dismissals). 
55 Under federal law, the prevailing party standard is typically based on whether 
the relief “ ‘materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying 
the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.’ ” Lefemine v. 
Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 4 (2012) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)).  
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relief.56  Similarly, a dismissal without prejudice may not indicate 
that a plaintiff definitively has not or will not recover some of  
the relief demanded, since the plaintiff may refile the same  
claim later.57  
In the foreclosure context, it may be difficult for a defendant 
to achieve prevailing party status.  Lenders, when confronted  
with defenses based on procedural deficiencies such as those 
related to service of process or notice of breach, may choose to 
voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice and refile  
after fixing any procedural problems.58  As noted above, forcing  
the foreclosing entity into a voluntary dismissal, or even  
winning a preliminary motion to dismiss, may not be sufficient  
to qualify the borrower-defendant as a prevailing party for 
fee-shifting purposes.59 
II. ANOTHER BARRIER FOR DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE CASES 
A. A Successful Defense as Justification for Avoiding 
Fee-Shifting 
This Article focuses on another area where courts have  
begun to limit the defenses and remedies available to 
borrower-defendants and their attorneys.  Lenders have creatively 
attempted to circumvent the application of such statutory 
fee-shifting regimes by using the borrower-defendants’ successful 
trial court arguments against them.  As mentioned above, 
borrower-defendants may employ an array of defenses to defeat 
the foreclosure claim instituted by the lender.  These defenses can 
include any number of lender deficiencies, such as the failure to 
comply with service of process requirements, failure to provide 
notice of breach in accordance with the requirements of the note 
 
56 See Blue Infiniti, LLC, 170 So. 3d at 139 (discussing cases in which payment of 
a majority of a plaintiff’s demanded amount resulted in a voluntary dismissal but not 
a reciprocal fee award). 
57 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Regan, Note, Plaintiffs’ Absolute Right to Voluntary 
Dismissal: Legitimate Right or Abuse of Judicial Process?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 118, 130 
(1984). Under federal law, this would be analyzed based on whether the legal 
relationship had been changed between the parties, and since the dismissal without 
prejudice does not change the legal relationship between the parties, the defendant 
would not be deemed the prevailing party. See Lefemine, 568 U.S. at 4 (citing Farrar, 
506 U.S. at 111–12). 
58 See Regan, supra note 57, at 120. 
59 See, e.g., Kelly v. BankUnited, FSB, 159 So. 3d 403, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015) (granting dismissal by virtue of a short sale not sufficient to merit prevailing 
party status). 
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or mortgage, or standing or real party in interest-based defenses.60  
During the rise of mortgage securitization, many lenders failed to 
document transfers in interest with assignments of mortgage or 
otherwise lost or destroyed key loan documents, which made it 
more difficult to demonstrate the rights to enforce the notes and 
mortgages that were the basis for the foreclosure claims.61  In some 
cases, the pressure to pursue foreclosure claims as fast as possible 
in the face of such documentation issues resulted in fraudulent 
practices such as backdating assignments, forging signatures, 
improper notarization, and other problematic practices.62  Despite 
documentation of these practices, few lenders or lender attorneys 
have received punishment for such actions.63 
Borrowers’ attorneys have relied upon these documentation 
problems and problematic assignment practices to construct 
defenses attacking the foreclosing entity’s standing or right to 
enforce the loan documents.64  Under these defense theories, if  
the foreclosing entity cannot properly document or is relying  
upon inaccurate or fraudulent documentation to support its 
enforcement of the note and mortgage, then the entity should not 
be granted final judgment and the right to foreclose.65  As indicated 
above, there appears to have been widespread fraud as well as 
negligent documentation practices in the assignment of mortgages 
and the prosecuting of foreclosure claims in the wake of the Great 
Recession.66  Presumably, such defenses have been employed in 
thousands of cases.67  These defenses are fairly intuitive and often 
conclusive, although courts have liberally permitted foreclosures 
in such instances despite the applicability of such defenses.68   
 
60 See Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or 
Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 501, 
515, 520–23, 525 (2013).  
61 See id. at 514–21, 550. 
62 See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 869–70. 
63 See id. at 890–94. 
64 See Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 50, at 13 (reporting “hordes” of 
lawyers denying that the foreclosing plaintiff has standing). 
65 See John B. Leach, Taking a Stand on Standing: The Real Party in Interest 
Conflict in Ohio Foreclosure Actions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 1099, 1099–100 (2012). 
66 See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
67 See Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of 
the Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17, 19, 33–34 (2011). 
68 See, e.g., Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine, supra note 9, at 609 (noting 
that courts largely accepted whichever of the numerous theories for standing 
attorneys created by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.); cf. Zacks & 
Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 410 (noting that courts disregard the reason for  
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Even where these defenses have been successful, lenders have 
begun to seek to avoid paying the borrower’s attorneys’ fees by 
using prevailing defense theories, such as standing, against the 
borrower’s attorney.69  While admitting that the statutory regime 
requiring a lender to pay the fees would generally apply if a 
borrower were successful, lenders argue that this regime only 
applies if the lender is in fact bound by the mortgage contract with 
the fee-shifting provision.70  Where borrowers have been successful 
in demonstrating that lenders do not have standing or the right to 
enforce the note and mortgage, lenders argue that, accordingly, 
they should not be bound by the fee-shifting provisions in contracts 
that otherwise would permit the court, under the fee-shifting 
statute, to require lenders to pay borrowers’ fees.71  An analogous 
argument suggests that when a borrower has successfully argued 
that a contract is void or unenforceable, then the same reasoning 
should follow.  Homeowners argue that these contentions, if 
accepted, create a “heads you win, tails I lose” scenario in which 
their successful defenses against meritless claims create the basis 
upon which to deny them recovery of their attorneys’ fees spent in 
proving the baselessness of the claims brought. 
B. Formalism to Protect Foreclosing Entities 
A lender that seeks to avoid fee-shifting by using a borrower’s 
successful standing or title defense against the borrower is often 
successful where the court is receptive to a formalistic argument.72  
Employed literally, a borrower that successfully demonstrated 
 
dismissals of foreclosure suits—whether due to outright fraud or mere technical 
deficiencies—when considering whether or not to apply statutes of limitation or res 
judicata against foreclosing banks). 
69 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Elkind, 254 So. 3d 1153, 1153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2018) (finding the bank unsuccessfully appealed an award of fees after voluntary 
dismissal, contending that a borrower who successfully asserts a standing defense 
cannot obtain reciprocity of fees under contract when a bank is held not a party to 
that contract). 
70 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB, 270 So. 3d 367, 368, 
369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (finding the bank unsuccessfully asserted same 
argument as was used in Elkind, whereafter the court ruled that a voluntary 
dismissal means the borrower’s standing argument has not been reached). 
71 See, e.g., Harris v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 2D17-2555, 2018 WL 6816177, at 
*3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018) (“[W]e recognize that the Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Districts each have held that when a party prevails by establishing that the plaintiff 
completely failed to prove standing, there is no longer a contract between the parties 
and no basis upon which to enforce a fee provision.”). 
72 See, e.g., Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248, 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1995) (“[W]e must return to the precise text of the agreement.”). 
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that the foreclosing entity lacked standing—for example, because 
it could not demonstrate the right to enforce the mortgage 
contract—would be unable to recover attorneys’ fees because it was 
successful in showing that the foreclosing entity was not a party 
to the contract.73  Since the foreclosing entity is not a  
party to the contract, it is not bound by the fee-shifting provision, 
which means that the borrower would not be entitled to rely  
upon the fee-shifting provision—or the statutory regime 
permitting attorneys’ fees recovery if there was a one-sided 
fee-shifting provision.74  Again, this logic would hold for the 
homeowner-defendant successful in alleging the contract was void, 
and it appears that such reasoning is now the majority rule  
in Florida.75 
For example, in Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, the circuit 
court dismissed Nationstar’s case with prejudice based on the 
argument from Glass, the borrower, that Nationstar, the lender, 
lacked standing to enforce the note and mortgage.76  Nationstar 
appealed and Glass filed a motion for appellate attorneys’ fees and 
costs.  On appeal, Glass argued that the court correctly dismissed 
the lender’s complaint for lack of standing, but also argued that 
she was entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees based upon the 
 
73 See, e.g., Harris, 2018 WL 6816177, at *3 (discussing Florida decisions in accord 
with this proposition). 
74 Cf. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 So. 2d at 1251–52 (“[I]n order to be responsible for 
fees, one first had to be responsible for the bill. But the unappealed result of trial was 
that under the agreement Mrs. McCoy had not assumed a responsibility for payment 
of the hospital bill. It follows that she also did not incur an obligation to pay attorney’s 
fees. Without an obligation to pay fees, there is no basis to invoke the compelled 
mutuality provision of section 57.105(2).”). In other mortgage foreclosure cases, 
lenders had sought to argue that an earlier dismissal—even with prejudice—did not 
mean that the defendant had prevailed with respect to standing issues to the extent 
that the lender had instituted new litigation that would address the same issues. 
Courts were less receptive to these arguments. See Bank of N.Y. v. Williams, 979 So. 
2d 347, 347–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“The refiling of the same suit after the 
voluntary dismissal does not alter the [defendants]’ right to recover prevailing party 
attorney’s fees incurred in defense of the first suit.”). Presumably, if these cases were 
relitigated now, the foreclosing entities would make the formalistic arguments we 
discuss herein and likely prevail. 
75 See, e.g., Harris, 2018 WL 6816177, at *4. Note, however, that Nationstar 
Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), was accepted for review 
by the Florida Supreme Court, and a substantive opinion was issued; after some 
membership changes on the court, a new opinion was issued reversing its prior 
decision to hear the matter and the original opinion was vacated. Nevertheless,  
the state of affairs as of the date of this writing demonstrates an immense  
progression in the acceptance of such arguments that preclude fee awards for  
homeowners’ attorneys. 
76 219 So. 3d at 898.  
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application of reciprocity contemplated in § 57.105(7) into the 
unilateral fee clause in the mortgage.77  Florida’s Fourth District 
Court of Appeals denied Glass’s motion for appellate attorneys’ 
fees, holding that “[a] party that prevails on its argument that 
dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue 
upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in 
that same contract.”78  
Other Florida cases follow similar reasoning.  In Bank of New 
York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Fitzgerald, the court denied 
attorneys’ fees to Fitzgerald, a borrower who had successfully 
prevailed on her standing argument.79  Fitzgerald had prevailed 
because the note produced was specially endorsed to JPMorgan 
Chase—not the foreclosing party—and because no other evidence 
of negotiation or transfer, such as an assignment of mortgage, was 
produced.80  Because the defendant demonstrated that Bank of 
New York Mellon was not a party to the contract and therefore not 
entitled to enforce it, the defendant could not invoke reciprocity of 
the attorneys’ fees provision.81  Even in cases where borrowers 
have obtained a dismissal based in part on their assertions that 
signatures on loan documents may have been forgeries, borrowers 
have been unable to recover attorneys’ fees because a forged 
document renders the document a “nullity,” meaning that there 
was no contract upon which to base a recovery of attorneys’ fees.82  
Notwithstanding the lender’s reliance on a fraudulent document, 
the court questioned how it could award attorneys’ fees under a 
contract that never existed.83 
 
77 See id. at 899. 
78 Id. 
79 215 So. 3d 116, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
80 See id. at 118. 
81 See id. at 121. 
82 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Mestre, 159 So. 3d 953, 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). This line of reasoning has been adopted from other contexts. See, e.g., HFC 
Collection Ctr., Inc. v. Alexander, 190 So. 3d 1114, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) 
(finding that the borrower was estopped from relying on the contract to obtain an 
attorneys’ fees award in the credit card borrowing context because Alexander had 
succeeded in proving there was no contract between the parties); Fla. Med. Ctr. Inc., 
v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248, 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that because the 
defendant had prevailed on her theory that she was not liable under a contract with 
respect to paying her husband’s hospital bill, she also could not invoke the mutuality 
provision of the fee-shifting statute).  
83 See Mestre, 159 So. 3d at 957. 
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Borrowers have also been denied relief in cases where the 
action was dismissed before the issue of standing was litigated.84  
In one instance, a court created a new burden of proof, requiring a 
borrower to demonstrate that it was a proper party to the contract.  
Indeed, that defendant sought to demonstrate that she never 
signed the mortgage contract and that any purported mortgage 
documents contained fraudulent borrower signatures.85  Although 
the defendant had not prevailed on those issues because the 
foreclosing entity chose instead to voluntarily dismiss her case, the 
court reasoned that she could not demonstrate that she was a 
proper party to the contract permitted to enforce the fee-shifting 
statute and related provision in the mortgage contract.86  The 
formalism of these approaches also can be seen in how such 
decisions distinguish earlier cases, such as Nudel v. Flagstar 
Bank, FSB. 
In Nudel, the court awarded attorneys’ fees to the borrower 
after it dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice based 
on a standing argument.87  In that case, the circuit court dismissed 
Flagstar’s foreclosure action without prejudice based on Nudel’s 
argument that Flagstar lacked standing because Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the named mortgagee under 
the applicable mortgage, did not assign the mortgage to Flagstar 
until after the inception of the lawsuit.88  Nudel then “moved for 
attorney’s fees and costs . . . relying in part on the attorney’s fee 
provision in the mortgage.”89  The circuit court denied Nudel’s 
motion for attorneys’ fees, and she appealed.90 
On appeal, Flagstar argued that Nudel was estopped from 
seeking attorneys’ fees under the mortgage after successfully 
arguing that Flagstar lacked standing to foreclose under the 
 
84 See Fla. Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So. 3d 1112, 1116 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that the borrower-defendant had the burden of 
proving that she was a party to the contract, which she failed to do). 
85 See id. at 1114. 
86 See id. at 1115–16. The court did note in its dicta that its decision should not 
be construed as to state that a party can never recover prevailing party fees when the 
defense is that they were not a party to the contract. See id. at 1116. A party could 
obtain sanctions, or if they are unsuccessful in their defense that they are not a  
party to the contract and ultimately prevail, then § 57.105(7)’s reciprocity may apply. 
See id.  
87 60 So. 3d 1163, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 See id. 
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mortgage.91  The court rejected this argument, holding that  
Nudel was entitled to recover her attorneys’ fees.92  Importantly, 
in rejecting Flagstar’s estoppel argument, the court explained  
that “Flagstar and Nudel were described as the ‘lender’ and 
‘borrower’ respectively in the mortgage and” therefore, “they 
[were] bound by it.”93  Courts denying attorneys’ fees to successful 
borrower-defendants have distinguished the Nudel case because 
Flagstar was named as the original party to the contract as the 
original lender.  In other instances, by contrast, the foreclosing 
entity has not been the original lender and could not rely on  
this distinction.94 
C. Normative Distinctions 
The above approaches do have some intuitive sense to them.  
If the borrower wants to argue that the foreclosing entity is not a 
party to the contract and is successful with respect to that defense, 
then the borrower seemingly should not be entitled to take 
advantage of any benefits in the contract that otherwise would 
have been binding had the foreclosing entity been a party.  This 
argument is fairly straightforward and attractive when applied to 
procedure and estoppel.95  However, many arguments support the 
opposite conclusion.  
If the foreclosing entity had prevailed after initiating 
foreclosure proceedings, then it would have been entitled to the 
benefits of the fees provision and to collect its fees from the 
 
91 See id. at 1165. 
92 See id.  
93 Id. 
94 See Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct.  
App. 2017). 
95 This line of reasoning is more compelling in the absence of a fee-shifting statute 
designed to provide mutuality of risk and remedy. Brown v. M St. Five, LLC, 56 A.3d 
765, 780 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e are troubled by M Street Five’s attempt to enforce a 
discrete provision of a contract that M Street Five itself argued was void ab initio; by 
doing so, M Street Five is essentially attempting to ‘have its cake and eat it too.’ ”). 
Although not a mortgage foreclosure case, Brown outlines the basic estoppel 
arguments relative to a defendant who successfully argues that a contract is void and 
then attempts to invoke the protection of a fee-shifting provision in a contract—and, 
notably, not the application of a fee-shifting statute. Judicial estoppel may be 
appropriate to prevent a party from changing positions if that party has already 
“taken a position before a court of law, whether in a pleading, in a deposition, or in 
testimony . . . .” Id. The “ ‘broader doctrine of “equitable estoppel” ’ ” prevents a party 
that knowingly accepts the benefits of a particular legal position or outcome from 
“ ‘ “subsequently tak[ing] an inconsistent position to avoid the corresponding 
obligations or effects.” ’ ” Id. at 780–81 (citation omitted). 
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borrower.  If anything, the foreclosing entity should be estopped 
from arguing that it is not a party to the contract—and should be 
deemed to have stipulated to this fact—for purposes of the 
fee-shifting regime.  Once the foreclosing entity has initiated the 
foreclosing proceeding, it is in fact arguing that it is a party to the 
contract or entitled to all of the benefits and also ought to be bound 
by all of the obligations of the contract.96  The formalist approach 
described above creates the exact “heads I win, tails you lose” 
situation referenced above, wherein the defendant borrower will 
be stuck with the fee-shifting provision if the foreclosing entity 
wins, but unable to recover her fees—and thus, still lose—under 
the fee-shifting regime designed to create mutuality under  
such provisions, even if she in fact prevails on a title or  
standing defense.97 
Indeed, even in Florida, which is the focus of this Article and 
other studies showing judicially created, singular exceptions to 
longstanding rules to the benefit of foreclosing entities, courts 
previously seemed to recognize the inherent inequity and inanity 
of allowing a party to argue such contradictory positions.  In 
Nudel, for example, the court noted that “Flagstar may not seek 
affirmative relief under the mortgage and then take the position 
that provisions of the mortgage do not apply to it.”98  This logic was 
the same as in earlier litigation calling for specific performance of 
a condition of a contract: 
[The losing plaintiff] contended before the trial court that as a 
result of the contract being cancelled prior to its assignment, the 
provision for attorney’s fees ceased to exist.  We hold that the  
 
 
 
 
96 One may note here that in no small part due to a number of ghastly ethical 
headlines made by banks and their attorneys in the conducting of foreclosure 
litigation, the Florida Supreme Court was forced to create an additional rule requiring 
verifications in foreclosure complaints. See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 
871; In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 So. 3d 555, 556 (Fla. 
2010) (per curiam). The major thrust behind requiring bank or servicer employees to 
verify what their lawyers plead in court is “to provide incentive for the plaintiff to 
appropriately investigate and verify its ownership of the note or right to enforce the 
note and ensure that the allegations in the complaint are accurate . . . .” Id. 
97 See Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d 804, 809 (Cal. 1995) (“The [fee-shifting] statute 
would fall short of this goal of full mutuality of remedy if its benefits were denied to 
parties who defeat contract claims by proving that they were not parties to the alleged 
contract or that it was never formed.”).  
98 Nudel, 60 So. 3d at 1165. 
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plaintiff is estopped to maintain such a position in an action in 
which he has sought specific performance of a contract providing 
for attorney’s fees.99   
In other jurisdictions, courts have concluded that “it is 
extraordinarily inequitable to deny a party who successfully 
defends an action on a contract, which claims attorney’s fees, the 
right to recover its attorney’s fees and costs simply because the 
party initiating the case has filed a frivolous lawsuit.”100  
California courts, for example, have looked to the underlying 
purpose and policies of the fee-shifting statutory regime as well as 
equitable principles, which are not as reconcilable with the more 
formalist approach described above.101  Since the purpose of such 
fee-shifting statutes is to ensure that each party bears an equal 
risk relative to paying the other party’s attorneys’ fees, California 
courts have concluded that a successful defense to a contract 
action, including a defense based on the “inapplicability, 
invalidity, unenforceability, or nonexistence” of the subject 
contract, justifies an award of attorneys’ fees to the defendant.102 
 
 
99 Ross v. Hacker, 284 So. 2d 399, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
100 Jones v. Drain, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Jones involved the 
enforceability of the compelled mutuality fee-shifting statute with respect to a real 
estate purchase contract. It is, however, worth noting that in California, the statutory 
language lends itself to a more liberal interpretation of who is entitled to take 
advantage of the compelled fee-shifting provision because it recognizes that a party 
may be sued on a contract even though it is not actually a party. Part 1717 of the 
California Civil Code allows for fees to be awarded to the prevailing party “whether 
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not . . . .” Hsu, 891 P.2d at 809 
(tracing the development of Part 1717 and the subsequent amendments by the 
California legislature to clarify that, among other issues, final judgments were not 
necessary for an award of fees and that success on non-contractual claims was 
irrelevant to fee awards under the statute). 
101 See, e.g., Jones, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (“The courts have consistently held that 
the award of Civil Code section 1717 contractual attorney’s fees is to be governed by 
equitable principles.”); Hsu, 891 P.2d at 813 (“[I]n determining litigation success, 
courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided 
by ‘equitable considerations.’ ”).  
102 N. Assoc. v. Bell, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (deciding whether 
a landlord could recover attorneys’ fees under a contract in a suit to terminate a 
month-to-month lease where the original written contract containing a fee-shifting 
provision had expired); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 599 P.2d 83, 85 (Cal. 1979) 
(finding that the fee-shifting statute’s “purposes require section 1717 be interpreted 
to further provide a reciprocal remedy for a nonsignatory defendant, sued on a 
contract as if he were a party to it, when a plaintiff would clearly be entitled to 
attorney’s fees should he prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation against  
the defendant”). 
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The estoppel argument outlined above by a formalist 
approach also ignores the context of these cases.  In these 
instances, the foreclosing entity is the party that instituted 
litigation and sought legal remedy against the borrowing entity.  
The estoppel argument might be more compelling if the borrower 
were actually the instigator of the litigation.  For example, if the 
borrower sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that the 
purported holder of the mortgage was not a valid lienholder 
because the mortgage-holder lacked title to the mortgage, then  
the estoppel argument in that context would make more sense.  
Since the borrower was affirmatively trying to avoid the contract,  
it should not be entitled to the benefits of the contract that 
otherwise would apply—that is, the fee-shifting provision and 
fee-shifting regime.103 
If one assumes that the fee-shifting statute concerns parties 
to the contract rather than the lawsuit, then such a formalistic 
approach is also consistent with interpretation principles that 
suggest construing a statute strictly where the statute overrules 
common law, as in the foreclosure context where the permissive 
fee-shifting regimes overrule the American Rule otherwise 
applicable under state law.104  This formalistic approach, however, 
ignores both the purpose of the fee-shifting regimes and the 
consequential effect of requiring a defendant to prove that the 
plaintiff was a party to the contract.  
Fee-shifting regimes, as discussed above, are designed to 
ensure that parties with inferior bargaining power will have 
access to adequate counsel even where such parties cannot obtain 
or sufficiently compensate counsel through traditional fee 
agreements.  In the negotiation or drafting context, the party may 
have been unable to require mutuality with respect to establishing 
an exception to the American Rule.  In the dispute context, the 
inability to recover fees from the opposing party empowers the 
 
103 See, e.g., Linear Tech. Corp. v. Tokyo Electron, Ltd., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 477, 484 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“If section 1717 did not apply in this situation [where a party 
prevailed in asserting that it was not bound by a contract that contained a fee-shifting 
provision], the right to attorney fees would be effectively unilateral—regardless  
of the reciprocal wording of the attorney fee provision allowing attorney fees to  
the prevailing attorney—because only the party seeking to affirm and enforce  
the agreement could invoke its attorney fee provision.” (internal quotation  
marks omitted)). 
104 See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg. LLC, v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (“[B]ecause the 
statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed.”); Fla.  
Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So. 3d 1112, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct.  
App. 2016). 
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more powerful party to be aggressive with respect to instituting 
claims and also protects the more powerful party, as the less 
powerful party may find it difficult to find counsel willing to 
institute or defend claims in the absence of such potential fee 
recovery.  By interpreting the fee-shifting regimes in such a  
way, courts reinforce the disparity in power between contracting 
parties.  Further, the strict interpretation creates a strange 
disincentive for a party to seek a certain type of victory or to  
only assert certain types of defenses in litigation, but not others.  
It certainly seems problematic for courts to effectively encourage 
attorneys to focus their defense efforts on some technical or 
procedural defenses but not defenses based on standing. 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Encouraging Cavalier Litigation and Repeat Offenders, and 
Discouraging Homeowner Representation 
Borrower-defendants may find it difficult to prevail with 
traditional legal arguments that otherwise would have provided a 
successful defense and corresponding prevailing party status.105  
Some courts have recently begun to ignore or rewrite the 
longstanding precedent that loan acceleration starts the statute of 
limitations clock or that acceleration consolidates the loan into an 
indivisible obligation for res judicata purposes.106  Instead, courts 
have permitted exceptions specifically for foreclosing entities; 
lenders may accelerate loans repeatedly and potentially refile 
deficient lawsuits ad infinitum with respect to the same 
underlying debt.107  Notably, these decisions largely ignore the 
reasons for prior dismissals and the implications of prior lender 
conduct in requiring such dismissals.108  By ignoring lenders’ prior 
acts, then, courts have signaled that banks may attempt to 
foreclose based on flimsy, nonexistent, or even fraudulent evidence 
and that will not preclude successful refiling of their claims. 
Similarly, in disallowing borrower discovery on assignment  
of mortgage issues and that in denying defenses based  
upon assignment problems implicated in chain of title or  
standing defenses, courts have likewise telegraphed that banks  
and foreclosing entities do not have to fear the implications of 
 
105 See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text. 
106 See Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 394–95. 
107 See id.  
108 See id. at 409. 
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filing thousands of forged or fraudulent documents.109  If  
these documents and discovery surrounding their production  
and submittal to courts and county clerks are routinely  
ruled irrelevant, then banks have no impetus to ensure that  
such documents are produced and recorded with accuracy upon  
proper verification.   
Much in the same way, denying attorneys’ fees for dismissals 
in foreclosure cases subtly indicates judicial disinterest in 
incentivizing banks and foreclosing entities to ensure their cases 
are supported with proper evidence.  If a given bank or foreclosing 
entity faces the decision of whether to proceed to file a case on 
questionable evidence rather than waiting to properly investigate 
and ensure the veracity of such evidence, then courts’ refusals to 
award fees in such instances are a clear gesture that banks need 
not worry about such a decision—little to no risk exists of bearing 
their adversaries’ attorneys’ fees.110  Of course, while this pattern 
of disincentivizing proper vetting of claims seems consistent 
throughout much of the judicial treatment examined in our prior 
works, an opposing view might hold that other court strictures are 
sufficient to prevent the filing of outright false claims and that 
attorneys’ fees awards do not therefore serve as any additional 
deterrent to cavalier behavior during litigation.111 
In this contrary view, the inherent power of the court to 
sanction litigants, or rules of procedure that specifically allow 
motions for sanctions for asserting baseless claims in the manner 
modeled after Federal Rule 11(b), is or ought to be enough for 
litigants to refrain from bringing questionable evidence or claims 
to court.112  Unfortunately, as our previous research has suggested, 
this has not been the case.113  The responses of state bar 
associations, legislatures, and judges have been notably tepid in 
the face of a litany of attorney misconduct in foreclosure actions.114  
As such, the removal of one of the few checks and balances on bank 
 
109 See Zacks & Zacks, A Standing Question, supra note 7, at 731–35. 
110 Indeed, empirical evidence shows that foreclosing entities bear a heavy burden 
of lost money each and every month when foreclosure litigation is elongated or 
delayed. Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 571–72. The perpetual rush to 
get cases to judgment from both foreclosing entities and their attorneys is a primary 
contributor to the ethical lapses documented in our previous work. Zacks, 
Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 904–05. 
111 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(1) (West 2019). For full text, see supra  
note 28. 
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c). 
113 See supra Introduction. 
114 See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 890–94. 
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conduct—the award of attorneys’ fees to one’s opponent when one’s 
claim is dismissed—will surely decrease what little incentive 
banks currently have to verify their claims before bringing them 
to court. 
Further, removal of the possibility of fee awards also 
potentially deters adequate representation of such 
borrower-defendants, as alluded to above.  Potential homeowners’ 
attorneys will undoubtedly be aware that winning a case on the 
basis of one certain argument but not on the basis of another may 
result in a court refusing to award fees.  As such, it is entirely 
possible that attorneys will focus more on issues where a 
possibility of fee awards lie, to the detriment of a strategy of 
focusing on the client’s best defenses whatever the subject area.  
This could have the deleterious effect of discouraging such 
attorneys from agreeing to represent indigent borrowers in such 
risky cases, even where there otherwise would be valid defenses.  
Or attorneys may simply be forced to charge distressed 
homeowners more, which would no doubt preclude representation 
for many indebted households.  In a practice area in which most 
homeowners may not be represented against foreclosing entities 
with endless wells of resources, further discouraging attorney 
representation will surely lead to more negative outcomes for  
such homeowners.115  
B. The “Systemic Frame” Here, as Elsewhere, Denigrates Basic 
Fairness to Civil Litigants 
Our previous research has remarked upon the seeming 
preference for courts to attempt to shorten foreclosure litigation 
timelines and to institute proceedings, rules, and litigation 
pathways that are separate and distinct from other routine 
consumer civil litigation.116  In this manner, courts and court 
administrators have purposefully placed foreclosures into large 
dockets, for example, in an effort to clear case backlogs.117  
Similarly, many jurisdictions utilized retired, unelected judges for 
the express purpose of disposing of foreclosure cases.118  
Yet part and parcel of this process has been the diminishment 
of borrowers’ counsel and their arguments.  Our previous work has 
described this kind of classification of foreclosure cases into 
 
115 See Clark & Barron, supra note 39, at 2. 
116 See supra Introduction. 
117 See Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 432–34. 
118 See id. at 433. 
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separate structures and processes, including employing retired 
judges to preside over packed dockets, as a “systemic fram[ing]” of 
all foreclosure litigation as a needlessly wasteful practice based 
upon dilatory defense tactics and baseless defenses.119 
In this view, the creeping refusal to award attorneys’ fees to 
successful homeowners is yet another outgrowth of this systemic 
framing of foreclosure litigation.  If one accepts the view through 
the systemic frame that accelerating the timetable of foreclosure 
litigation is a valid policy goal and that borrower defenses are 
needless ploys to delay the inevitable “right” substantive result, it 
follows that foreclosing entities should routinely win cases without 
answering questions regarding their assignments of mortgage.  
Statutes of limitation similarly should be amended or interpreted 
very liberally so as to allow foreclosing entities to refile cases as 
many times as necessary to eventually win.  The creation of new 
exceptions and rules to effectuate a refusal to award fees in the 
rare case of a foreclosure dismissal, then, is simply another data 
point suggesting the movement towards an unrestrained and 
effectively nonjudicial foreclosure process with increasingly 
impossible litigation burdens for homeowners.   
Put another way, refusing to award attorneys’ fees may 
simply be another demonstration of state actors’ singular view of 
foreclosure litigation as something distinct from a traditional and 
neutral fact-finding civil litigation expedition.  First, the systemic 
frame implicates and ratifies the idea that if “[t]he [borrower] 
didn’t pay the mortgage, we’re done here.”120  Individual cases and 
therefore individual or novel defenses are not in focus through this 
frame—the defendant enters the courtroom with a presumption of 
default and unjustified delay.   
The frame also places dismissals or the reasons for such 
dismissals in a position of little or no importance—indeed, rather 
uniquely in civil litigation, statutes of limitation and res judicata 
may not apply if one of the parties happens to be a foreclosing bank 
or servicer.121  Whether a case was dismissed for missing a 
deadline by a day or whether a case was dismissed because of 
fraud is simply not in focus through the frame—because dismissal 
of a foreclosure claim, for whatever reason, is just a minor 
 
119 See id. at 432, 434. One would not expect, for example, judges in other civil 
litigation involving significant property transfers to remark that “[i]f you can’t do [the 
foreclosure trial] within an hour, you’re not a trial attorney.” Id. at 429 n.271. 
120 Id. at 433. 
121 See id. at 390. 
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roadblock delaying an inevitable judgment against a homeowner 
assumed to be in default.  Finally, in discouraging such dismissals 
and in dulling the effect of and reasons for such dismissals, it 
seems to follow that when such dismissals actually occur, they 
ought not to be rewarded or encouraged through attorneys’ fees 
awards.  If one examined each of these noted developments in 
foreclosure litigation in isolation, then perhaps support for the 
existence of systemic framing might rightfully be challenged.  
Taken in toto, however, this Article argues that the effects  
of systemic framing are present throughout all stages of 
litigation—including after a dismissal when a homeowner is 
seeking recoupment of her attorneys’ fees.   
C. Incentivizing Superficiality and Guesswork 
The final implications of the development of creeping 
preclusion of reciprocal fee awards for homeowners are the 
creation of incentives for litigants to focus on technicalities and the 
necessity for judges to undertake artificial guesswork when 
considering whether to award fees.  With regard to defenses, some 
courts now require borrowers to prevail on standing to obtain a 
dismissal, while later requiring borrowers to demonstrate that the 
bank had standing, in order to get a fee award.122  Attorneys, 
therefore, may simply choose to focus their clients’ limited 
litigation resources on more technical aspects of defense work if 
they are aware that winning a dismissal based upon standing 
defenses may not provide as impactful a victory as a dismissal 
based upon a technical defense.  In a practice area rampant with 
a host of past ethical failures, one would hope courts would 
encourage serious examination of whether a foreclosing plaintiff  
is being truthful.  Yet in failing to award fees for successful 
fact-finding expeditions regarding standing, courts will be 
presented with fewer of these substantive arguments.  As such, 
courts are less likely to expose those cases where a party is 
actually attempting to foreclose without a wholly truthful case.  If 
anything, those parties facing dismissal based upon a more 
technical defense ought to be given the softer landing of not paying 
their opponent’s fees—and not those facing dismissal for creating 
false evidence on standing or failing to meet the minimal burden 
of showing entitlement to enforce and collect on a loan. 
 
122 Fla. Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So. 3d 1112, 1116 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
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Further, the artificial creation of a subject-area exception to 
reciprocal fee awards in the context of successful standing in 
mortgage foreclosure-defense litigation can only breed more 
artificiality and guesswork.  Courts that are more sympathetic to 
homeowners have already been forced to create illogical 
distinctions in order to award reciprocal fees in such cases.  One 
Florida appellate district, in Madl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., for 
example, created a strange distinction in awarding fees:  when a 
foreclosing entity does not show evidence of standing at the 
inception of a case but later produces some evidence of standing at 
trial, such as an undated allonge to the note filed after the 
inception of the case, fees may be reciprocally awarded to the 
successful homeowner if the case is dismissed.123  This of course 
creates the strange requirement for homeowners to prevail at trial 
in preventing the foreclosing entity from meeting its burden of 
proof regarding standing, but to later prove—for purposes of a fee 
award—that some amount of evidence was produced that 
evidences their opponent’s standing.  Must a court, under this line 
of reasoning, specify what percentage of a borrower’s defense was 
devoted to standing, and if so, what percentage of its burden of 
proof the bank met or what percentage of its standing allegations 
were proven?   
But guesswork and other imprecise approaches to reach a 
certain result are not restricted to those more pro-homeowner 
districts.  Indeed, because Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass has 
been accepted, ruled upon, and then vacated by the Florida 
Supreme Court,124 the procedural posture makes it difficult to 
 
123 244 So. 3d 1134, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); cf. Harris v. Bank of N.Y. 
Mellon, No. 2D17-2555, 2018 WL 6816177, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018). 
124 See generally Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. Dist.  
Ct. App. 2017). We note that our concerns over judicial guesswork were partially 
concurred with in the Florida Supreme Court’s eventual opinion in Glass. Glass v. 
Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. SC17-1387, 2019 Fla. LEXIS 30, at *8–9 (Fla. Jan. 4, 
2019). Although the decision was eventually receded from after appointment of new 
judges to the court, the original decision notes, as we do, that part of its disagreement 
with the Fourth District’s decision stems from a disagreement on the reason for the 
original trial court dismissal. This is exactly the kind of ex post guesswork that we 
warn against in this Section. See id. at *7–8 (discussing the affirmative defenses 
raised by the borrowers and noting that the trial court did not explicitly state the 
grounds for dismissal and that the Fourth District incorrectly stated that standing 
was the only grounds for dismissal). Yet whether one ultimately agrees or disagrees 
with the outcome of the Glass decisions, they support the idea that an entire appellate 
court sitting en banc can directly contravene or omit arguments that litigants have 
propounded in order to guess or estimate what portion of a dismissal is based upon 
standing arguments in order to reach a result under the creeping fee preclusion 
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follow the court’s logic in reaching its decision refusing to  
award attorneys’ fees.  The court in Glass emphatically notes the 
distinction between cases not awarding fees because a foreclosing 
entity was not a party to the contract and cases such as Nudel.125  
In Nudel, the court noted, the foreclosing entity was named as the 
original lender.126  In this way, the court seemed to intimate that 
this had some independent significance to show Flagstar was a 
party to the Nudel contract subject to its fees provision.  But this 
decision was made after Flagstar had its claim dismissed for lack 
of standing.  If a litigant has its case dismissed because it cannot 
prove standing or entitlement to enforce an instrument, then what 
difference could it make if the written agreement states the 
litigant is, in fact, a party to the contract?  In either event, when 
forced to assert a prima facie case or to meet its burden at trial, 
the litigant failed to prove standing, rendering such distinctions 
meaningless:  a litigant whose case has been dismissed has proven 
nothing.  Both the anti-homeowner and pro-homeowner sides of 
the reciprocal fee award court division are increasingly required to 
stretch all logic to reach their decisions, and we therefore suggest 
that the newly created anti-reciprocal fee award jurisprudence is 
regrettable in this respect as well.   
In this way, failing to uniformly award reciprocal fee awards 
forces litigants to channel their inner Bob Arum, the famed boxing 
promoter, when seeking fee awards:  they must effectively argue 
that “Yesterday I was lying” (when I argued the bank lacked 
standing), “but today I am telling the truth” (as today I argue for 
the bank’s standing and fees obligation under the contract).  
Foreclosing entities are similarly pushed into making nonsensical 
arguments: to avoid reciprocal fee awards, banks in Florida must 
argue and verify under penalty of perjury that they have standing 
to enforce the mortgage contract in their written pleadings, but 
then effectively proclaim after dismissal, “Yesterday I was lying.”   
 
 
jurisprudence we have described. The Florida Supreme Court, at least until its opinion 
was receded from, noted that the Fourth District, at least in Glass, guessed wrong. 
See id. at *7–9. (The Fourth District “both misstates the basis of the trial court’s ruling 
on Glass’s motion for dismissal and fails to address Glass’s Motion for appellate 
attorney’s fees based on the voluntary dismissal. . . . [T]he Fourth District stated, ‘On 
appeal, [Glass] argued that the court correctly dismissed the Lender’s complaint for 
lack of standing.’ This is not an accurate statement of Glass’s argument.”). 
125 Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 219 So. 3d at 898. 
126 Nudel v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 60 So. 3d 1163, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
